In 2004, Guo Xianghuo, who is now a post-doctoral fellow at China University of Political Science and Law and an associate professor at Taiyuan University of Science and Technology, conducted research on factors that negatively influence village elections by doing fieldwork in Punan, a region in Shanxi (it includes parts of the city regions of Linfen and Yuncheng).  He found that interference by higher levels of government as well as vote-buying and other forms of corruption are some of the most detrimental forces affecting local elections.  Of the villages he surveyed, 70% had experienced some type of interference by higher levels of government, with 30% saying that the higher levels decided the results of elections.  Most candidates – especially those that want to be elected village head or village party secretary – need at least the approval of upper levels of government, otherwise it is difficult or impossible to be elected.  It is a factor that cannot be ignored in village elections.

     

Of course, interference varies a great deal, but an election in "Village B" demonstrates, at the extreme, what can result if upper levels of government have too much invested in deciding the results of elections.  In this village, Zhao Mou (a pseudonym), the former village party secretary, was the township government's choice for village head.  In order to guarantee that he won, he proceeded to attempt to buy-off voters, but thanks to his reputation for corruption as party secretary, villagers refused to accept the bribe.  Zhao Mou lost the election twice, but township level observers refused to acknowledge the results.  After the third election – in which it is assumed he also lost – the township officials, clearly violating standard procedure, refused to open the ballot box in the village, insisting on taking it elsewhere to count the votes.  Villagers surrounded the officials, not permitting them to leave for seven or eight hours until they were illegally detained.  A later investigation exonerated all officials and led to the arrest of three instigators among villagers; yet three months later the village still had not filled the position of village head.

     

From this example, it is obvious that bureaucratic privilege is a major problem.  The letter of the law provides clear instructions for how to carry out elections, including "election results should be publicized at the election site," which the township level officials clearly violated.  In this case, both the people's and national government's interests – to have a free and fair election – were aligned, but instead of executing state power, the local level bureaucracy acted to further its own bureaucratic and organizational interests.  This is not an isolated incident, as there are examples all over China that demonstrate local governments' lack of support for village self-governance.  For example, in Hubei, more than 50% of elected village heads under the jurisdiction of Qianjiang city were – against regulations – removed from office and replaced.  These actions on the part of local government officials undermine the people's trust in the system, as many people now view elections as just a game. 

     

Actions on the part of local bureaucracy that undermine the rule of law demonstrate the difficulties in managing a centralized system like the one China has.  While local government should act as a bridge between the central government and the people, it has instead been acting in its own private interests, which only serves to aggravate problems between the people and the government instead of alleviating them.  Part of this problem derives from China's historical experience.  During most dynasties, state power was very centralized as the government suppressed local bureaucratic interests.  At that time, the state apparatus only went down to the county level, with clans responsible for governance beyond that point.  The Communist Party greatly extended the reach of the government with the institution of the people's commune system, making every attempt to eliminate clan and other linkages but maintaining the idea of centralized control.  However, the village self-governance that has been instituted in the past two decades appears to contradict the well-ingrained idea that upper levels of government control lower levels.  Also, the great expansion of the local bureaucracy under the CCP has helped create a bureaucracy that serves its own interests instead of that of the state's.  A stable, functioning relationship between the three parties – state, bureaucracy, and the people – needs to be established in order to address the problem of upper level interference in local elections.

     

Upper level interference also engenders other problems such as vote-buying and "evil forces."  Vote-buying cannot be entirely blamed on upper level bureaucracy, as while it is less risky and less expensive to bribe upper level officials, they are not the people who vote, and buying off voters is becoming more and more prevalent.  Of the villages that were investigated, 50% had experienced this form of corruption, though it only influenced election outcomes in 30%.  In 40% of villages, it was unknown whether or not this occurred.  The prevalence of paying for votes demonstrates that democracy remains undeveloped; many villagers feel they don't have any political efficacy, so they might as well vote for whoever pays them, while others believe that they will benefit later on if they vote for those who dole out bribes.  The solution to this problem is raising the cost of vote buying, which can be achieved by expanding the electorate; educating people about the importance of democracy will encourage more people to participate and, hopefully, make it less likely that they accept bribes.

     

Of investigated villages, 50% said that multifarious evil forces played some type of role, but they only influenced election results in 10% of villages.  These groups do not usually involve themselves in government, though they do sometimes work with local government, which can create an especially oppressive system.  Punan did make some effort to crackdown on such groups in the 1990s, executing two group leaders.  Corruption on the part of village cadres is also a serious problem, usually only varying by degree, with wealthier villages often having more serious corruption problems.  This practice is widely condoned by upper level bureaucrats, as they often work with village leaders as a single interest group.  Higher levels of government only seem to care that village officials do not encounter serious problems that could affect their own jobs.

     

With so many problems, how can village elections continue?  Democratic elections can help provide a social basis, as many villagers are interested in village affairs but they do not have a deep understanding of democracy.  As the Punan region is still developing – currently transitioning from an agricultural society to an industrial one – democratic development will also be a long process.  This process can't be rushed, as while impulsiveness might be natural in early stages of democracy, it can often impede development.  Reason – not revolution – is necessary, as is a spirit of tolerance and compromise.  Elections where clans compete on a zero-sum basis, with the winner denying access to public goods to the other side, certainly do not adhere to this spirit and merely represent a continuation of authoritarian thinking.  While it may seem that the political turmoil and class warfare of the 1960s and 70s erased a capacity for tolerance in the Chinese people, moderation and aversion to extremism are also part of Chinese culture, as values espoused by Confucius.  Chinese culture and tradition can and should be used as a basis for building democracy, as adopting democratic principles does not mean abandoning Chinese roots.  Developing democracy is a difficult process that cannot be completed over night.  Instead, more time and practice are needed if this process is to succeed.