Riots in Xinjiang point to a new dimension to ethnic conflict in China
Author(s): CEG editor
 Posted: 2009-7-7
Source:http://en.chinaelections.org
Source date:2009-7-7
Number of hits:2588
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The number of "mass incidents" in China has been on the rise. This year is no exception and Chinese officials can add the recent rioting in Xinjiang province to the already staggering annual number of 80,000 incidents.
     
The current conflict in Xinjiang, a region marked by its dominant Uyghur population and violent separatist movement, began with the controversy over a conflict between Han and Uyghur workers at Xuri Toy factory in Guangdong. The brawl was sparked by rumors that Uyghur workers raped two Han Chinese girls.  Fighting left 2 Uyghurs dead, and 118 injured.
     
What began as a march in Urumchi, demanding to investigate the fighting in the Guangdong factory, descended into mass riots. Buses and buildings were set ablaze and bystanders were attacked. Reports from state media indicate 140 deaths and 828 wounded, although details concerning the identity of the victims have not been released. Several hundred Uyghur protestors have been arrested. Authorities have since blocked internet access and Twitter, in an effort to stem information flow from the province and prevent riots from escalating.   
     
The accuracy regarding the death toll is questionable. The official numbers by state media have been rapidly changing, with Xinhua earlier reporting 3 civilian deaths. As in the case with the Tibetan riots in March 2008, biased media coverage focusing on the attacks against Han Chinese highlight the state's interest to discredit minority discontent.  
     
Regardless of the official reports, the commonality linking the 2008 riots in Tibet with Monday's clash in Xinjiang is the emergence of a new level of ethnic conflict that complicates how Beijing manages minorities. Looting and attacks on Han civilians indicate the prevalence of horizontal violence between minorities and Han-Chinese at the micro-level. This therefore marks a shift from cases of vertical violence, referring to clashes between minorities and state authorities at the macro-level. Han civilians are now targets along with the state.
     
This new dimension to China's ethnic conflict is an unintended consequence of Beijing's policies to contain the threat of ethnic 'splittism' in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. A reason for the rise in violence against Han-Chinese civilians is simply the rise in Han migration to these minority provinces. The "Open up the West" campaign of early 2000 sought to develop the western provinces by injecting capital in infrastructure and public works in the region. Officials believed that economic development would quell unrest and settle minority discontent.
     
However the result was a tremendous inflow of Han migrant workers. Mongolians in Inner Mongolia for instance now represent a minority in the province, making up less than 20 percent of the population. In Urumqi, the Han Chinese makes up a large percentage of the population. The rise in Han migrant workers has thus caused new lines of ethnic fissures, concerning discrimination over hiring, ethnic division of labor and socio-economic marginalization on ethnic lines.
     
The fall-out to this policy is the hardening of ethnic identities, as the increase presence of Han people makes ethnic differences more salient, and as seen with the recent violence, more direct conflict with the Han Chinese.
     
The rise in cases of horizontal violence marks an interesting shift in ethnic relations in China. The state, which was seen as a party to the conflict and as an enemy to minority rights, must now also play the role of arbiter mediating between ethnic groups. The paradoxical outcome is that the new level of conflict was created by the state. Where some scholars trace ethnic conflict to historical, deeply entrenched hatred, it is interesting to see how ethnic group conflict in China's case is a product of its own policies. 
     
Ethnic conflict is therefore likely to perpetuate itself. With reports of Han deaths and Han victimization, anti-minority sentiment from the Han population will undoubtedly rise. It becomes unlikely for the rest of Han population to demonstrate support for financial subsidies going to the minority regions or minority claims for autonomy. Beijing's usual harsh clamp-down will therefore receive wide backing. As a result, a vicious cycle of ethnic hatred is created, entailing a complicated web of players; Han Chinese, Uyghurs and the state.
 
Given that the Chinese government places social stability at the heart of the Party's legitimacy, a rise in conflict between groups is equally detrimental and problematic for officials. The recent riots will not likely lead to a reevaluation of its policies or a stop in the flow of Han migrants. This is evident as Chinese officials blame the uprising in Xinjiang on Rebiya Kadeer, a Uyghur exile and President of the World Uyghur Congress.
     
If inter-ethnic tension arises as easily as it had in Guangdong and has explosive implications as it resulted in Xinjiang, Beijing will increasingly find it difficult to reconcile the discourse on building a harmonious society. A rise in inter-ethnic conflict and horizontal violence should set alarm bells for Chinese leaders that policies on ethnic splittism has taken a life of its own and opened up new sources of tension that may be increasingly more difficult to contain in the future.